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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
The names of all parties to the proceedings in the lower court are set forth in the caption of
the case on appeal.
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this matter is properly before this Court pursuant to Article VIE, Section 3
of the Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question presented on appeal is whether the lower court was correct in granting
Defendant's request to stay the breach of contract action, but denying Defendant's request to stay
the bad faith action and then ordering that it respond to discovery that may be relevant in the bad
faith action. This question involves the determination of the following issues:
1.

Is a showing of "legal entitlement" a prerequisite to maintaining a claim for
underinsured motorist (UM) benefits?

2.

Should Plaintiffs' claim for bad faith be stayed pending Plaintiffs showing breach
of contract?

3.

Should proceedings in an action for bad faith be stayed pending a showing by
Plaintiffs of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits and breach of contract, thereby
preventing discovery of matters relating only to the bad faith action?

4.

Does a showing of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits establish that the insurance
company has breached its insurance contract or the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing with Plaintiffs?

The lower court's legal conclusions staying the breach of contract claim, allowing the bad
faith claim to proceed without first showing "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits and then
1
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ordering discovery on the bad faith claim is reviewed for correctness. Lieber v. ITTHartford
Ins. Ctr., Inc., 15 P.3d 1030 (Ut. 2000); Miller v. USAA Casualty Ins., 44 P.3d 663, 670 (Ut.
2002).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT
The issues presented on appeal were preserved by Defendant's Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Faith and Associated Causes;
Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel and Request for a Protective Order
Pursuant to Rule 26(c) (R. 117-127); and Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 177-178,
180-199).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of Plaintiffs' claim for underinsured motorist benefits because of an
automobile accident which occurred on May 10, 2001, resulting in alleged injuries to Plaintiffs.
After receiving the policy limits from the tortfeasor's insurance carrier, Plaintiffs made a demand
for the policy limits under the underinsured motorist provision of their insurance policy with
Farmers Insurance Exchange ("Farmers"). While Farmers was investigating the claim, Plaintiffs
filed suit alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad
faith), and breach of fiduciary duty based on Farmers' failure to "diligently" investigate, evaluate,
negotiate and reject or settle Plaintiffs' claim. (Plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty was
dismissed pursuant to Stipulation and Order on July 15, 2003).

2
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Because of a dispute as to the value of the claim, Farmers elected arbitration pursuant to
the arbitration provision in its policy and U.C.A. §78-31a-4 and §31A-21-13. Plaintiffs initially
objected to arbitration so Farmers filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiffs'
underinsured motorist (UM) claim only and requested that the breach of contract, bad faith and
associated causes of action be stayed. Defendant argued that the arbitration provision in its
policy was valid and enforceable and that the arbitration of the Plaintiffs' UIM claim would
establish whether Plaintiffs were "legally entitled" to benefits under the policy, a prerequisite to
establishing whether there was a breach of the insurance contract, a prerequisite tofilinga bad
faith claim. Defendant requested that the lower court stay the breach of contract and bad faith
claims pending a resolution of Plaintiffs' claim for UIM benefits in an arbitration proceeding.
Plaintiffs conceded that their UIM claim should be resolved in arbitration, but argued that
they were not required to arbitrate their breach of contract or bad faith claim and requested the
court sever the breach of contract and bad faith claimfromthe UIM claim which "probably
should be arbitrated in accordance with Defendant's motion and the policy's arbitration
provision." (R. 104). Subsequently, Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate the matter but, simultaneously
with the arbitration, wanted to proceed forward with the breach of contract and bad faith action.
Plaintiffs also filed a motion to compel responses to requests for admissions and requests
for production of documents pertaining to the bad faith claim. In response, Defendant sought a

3
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protective order requesting that it be protected from responding to discovery associated with the
bad faith claim until Plaintiffs had established that they were "legally entitled" to UIM benefits
under the policy. Farmers maintained that the discovery sought by Plaintiffs in connection with
their bad faith claim would prejudice Defendant's position against Plaintiffs in the arbitration
proceeding to determine whether Plaintiffs were entitled to UIM benefits.
Following a hearing on Plaintiffs' Rule 37 Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery,
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Faith
and Associated Causes, and Defendant's Motion for Protective Order Pursuant to Rule 26(c), the
court ordered that Plaintiffs' breach of contract action be stayed pending arbitration of Plaintiffs'
claim for UIM benefits, but denied Defendant's request to stay the bad faith claim. In addition,
Plaintiffs' motion to compel Defendant's responses to requests for admissions and requests for
production of documents was granted as to the requests for admissions (but since a copy of the
requests for production of documents had not been provided to the court, the court made no
ruling on the motion to compel with regard to those, nor on Defendant's motion for protective
order regarding the same).
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that before Plaintiffs
could recover for either breach of contract or bad faith, they must first establish that they were
"legally entitled" to UIM benefits and, therefore, all proceedings should be stayed pending a
resolution of the "legal entitlement" issue. Defendant further argued that discovery in connection
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with Plaintiffs' bad faith claim was inappropriate and prejudicial to Defendant until Plaintiffs had
shown that they were "legally entitled" to the contract benefits. Plaintiffs opposed Defendant's
motion for reconsideration, arguing that establishing "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits was not
a prerequisite to filing a claim for bad faith and that such a claim could be based on the refusal to
bargain or settle, standing alone. The court denied Defendant's motion for reconsideration and,
now having seen the requests for production of documents, granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel
Defendant's responses to the requests and denied Defendant's motion for a protective order (with
the exception of Request No. 10, which was subject to the protective order) (R. 175). In
addition, the court denied Defendant's request to stay its order pending a decision on the Petition
for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, which had been filed. Defendant thenfileda
Motion for Expedited Stay in this Court, which was granted on November 25, 2003 pending a
decision on the petition for interlocutory appeal.
In the meantime, Scott Daniels, the arbitrator on Plaintiffs' UIM claim, issued his
decision on December 8, 2003 finding: that Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was scheduled to
undergo cervical surgery during the week following the arbitration; that the settlementfromthe
tortfeasor's liability carrier was reasonable until it was determined that Mr. Christiansen needed
surgery; that Mr. Christiansen had not proven his claim for loss of past or future income as a
result of the underlying motor vehicle accident, and; that Mr. Christensen had not proven his
claim for past or future wage loss. Mr. Daniels also determined that Mr. Christiansen had a pre-
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existing condition and, because of this, apportioned the need for the surgery 50% to the accident
and 50% to pre-existing. Mr. Daniels then awarded general and special damages, based on this
apportionment and assuming that Mr. Christensen was going to have surgery, in the amount of
$74,867.50, which amounted to 50% of the costs that were attributable to the motor vehicle
accident. In doing so, the arbitrator also decided to retain jurisdiction to modify the award if Mr.
Christiansen did not proceed with his scheduled surgery (Exhibit 1 to Motion to Set Aside
Permission for Interlocutory Appeal Due to Change in Circumstances filed by Plaintiffs with this
Court) (Addendum). On December 10, 2003, Defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal was
granted.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to set aside the interlocutory appeal arguing that "if there
was any need to demonstrate 'legal entitlement' to UIM benefits before proceeding on the bad
faith claim", the arbitration award satisfied that. This Court, however, ordered that the issues
raised in the interlocutory appeal proceed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 10, 2001, Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was involved in a motor vehicle accident
with Umar Raja. As a result of this accident, Mr.Christiansen claimed personal injuries and Mrs.
Christiansen claimed additional household services and compensation for past and future
personal care of Mr. Christiansen (Plaintiffs' Complaint, R. 1-8). Mr. Christiansen subsequently
settled with Mr. Raja's automobile liability carrier for $50,000, the policy limits (Plaintiffs'
Complaint, R. 1-8). Plaintiff Byron Christiansen then filed a claim for UIM benefits with
6
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Farmers, his own insurance carrier, specifically seeking the UIM limits under his policy
(Plaintiffs'Complaint, R. 4; R. 73-74).
On August 19,2002, Plaintiffs then made a demand for the UIM policy limits (R. 44-94).
On October 24, 2002, Farmers retained Mike Hansen to evaluate and/or arbitrate Plaintiffs'
request for the UIM benefits. In furtherance of this, Mr. Hansen requested various documents
from Plaintiffs and also that Plaintiff Byron Christiansen submit to a sworn statement. That
sworn statement was set for November 1, 2002 at 11:00 a.m. (R. 76). Plaintiff failed to timely
provide the information requested by Mr. Hansen. For example, the income tax returns were
provided on the morning of the scheduled sworn statement (R. 76, 80). Plaintiffs' counsel sent
additional information concerning his clients' UIM claim to counsel for Farmers on November
12, 2002, November 25, 2002 and by fax on March 11, 2003 (R. 82, 85, 92-93). Information
sent on March 11, 2003 was a list of 15 medical providers seen by Plaintiff Byron Christiansen
(R.93).
On April 11, 2003, Plaintiffs filed suit in Third District Court alleging breach of contract,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and breach of fiduciary duty (R. 18). In response, Ms. Maw was retained to defend Farmers. After filing an answer, Defendant
then filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach of Contract, Bad Faith and
Associated Causes (R. 31-32). Defendant also filed a Motion for Protective Order in response to
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel (R. 42-43, 128-129). As previously set forth in the "Statement of
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the Case", the court ordered that Plaintiffs' UIM claim be resolved in arbitration, even though the
parties had already stipulated to this, and granted Defendant's request to stay the breach of
contract action, but denied Defendant's request to stay the bad faith action and ordered discovery
that would be pertinent, if at all, only to the bad faith action to proceed. (R. 172-176, 231, 233235).
On December 4, 2003, Plaintiffs' UIM claim was arbitrated by Scott Daniels. The
arbitrator issued his ruling on December 8, 2003, finding that Mr. Christiansen was set to have
cervical surgery the week following the arbitration, which would cost $49,735 in addition to
medical costs previously incurred as a result of the accident of May 10, 2001. He also found that
Mr. Christensen aggravated a pre-existing, non-symptomatic degenerative cervical condition, but
that by July 18, 2001, he had improved considerably. Mr. Daniels also determined that Mr.
Christiansen had a relapse at the end of July and into August of 2001, possibly due to several
mechanisms unrelated to this motor vehicle suggested by the arbitrator and, in any event, Mr.
Christiansen's problems at the time of the December 4, 2003 arbitration were a combination of a
pre-existing condition, the automobile accident (noted as being very minor), and whatever
triggered the July, 2001 setback. Further, that the settlement from the (tortfeasor's) liability
carrier was reasonable prior to learning that he was to have surgery the week after the arbitration
and that the accident was 50% responsible for the need for this surgery and, therefore, the
Christiansens were entitled to the sum of $74,867.50, representing one-half of the cost of surgery
and one-half of the total general damages awarded associated with the surgery (included in the
8
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general damages was an amount for Merrilee Christiansen's loss as a result of having to work
more in the business). Mr. Daniels determined that the Christiansens were not entitled to interest
on the medical specials in that they had not yet been incurred. Finally, the arbitrator indicated
that he would retain jurisdiction to modify the award if the petitioner did not have the scheduled
surgery (Exhibit 1 to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Permission for Interlocutory Appeal Due to
Change in Circumstances) (Addendum). The arbitrator's award was paid by Farmers to Byron
Christiansen on December 15, 2003.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiffs' claim for UIM benefits is determined by their insurance policy. That policy
provides UIM benefits as follows:
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as
damagesfromthe owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of
bodily injury sustained by the insured driver while occupying your insured car.
(Second Edition, E-Z Reader Car Policy, Utah p. 8.) (R. 123) (Emphasis added)
This provision is consistent with Utah's underinsured motorist statute, U.C.A. §31A-22305(9)(a), which provides for underinsured motorist coverage "for covered persons who are
legally entitled to recover damagesfromowners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death." (Emphasis added)
Utah case law interpreting the "legally entitled" to language established that this can be
shown by either obtaining a judgment or with a formal or informal settlement among the parties.

9
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In this case, the parties could not reach an agreement on Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to recover
UIM benefits, and opted to resolve this pursuant to the arbitration provision in the policy.
Plaintiffs have ignored the legal significance of this "legally entitled" to language and
instead rely on Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Ut. 1985) for the proposition that a
refusal to bargain or settle, standing along, may be sufficient to prove bad faith, in essence
creating an independent tort. However, in Beck, the Plaintiff was already determined to be
"legally entitled" to the uninsured motorist benefits. For this reason, and others, the Beck
language does not negate that Plaintiffs are required to first establish that they are "legally
entitled" to UIM benefits, before pursuing a bad faith claim against their insurance company.
This position was confirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Chatterton v. Walker, 938 P.2d 255
(Ut. 1997), wherein the Court made it clear that "legal entitlement" to the policy benefits must be
shown before a bad faith claim can be brought against the insurance company.
Here, where Plaintiffs simultaneously filed their claim for benefits under their insurance
contract and their breach of contract and bad faith claim against the insurance company, the bad
faith claim should have been stayed pending a showing not only of "legal entitlement" to UIM
benefits, but breach of contract as well. This then requires that Plaintiffs first establish that they
are "legally entitled" to benefits, which the parties and trial court agreed would be determined by
arbitration.

10
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The trial court, however, while staying the breach of contract action, incorrectly refused
to stay the proceedings on Plaintiffs' bad faith action. Having wrongfully allowed the bad faith
action to go forward, the trial court also denied Defendant's request for a protective order and
allowed Plaintiffs to pursue discovery purportedly sought in connection with their bad faith
claim, but which would prejudice the arbitration of the claim for UIM benefits. This prejudice
was demonstrated by the very materials sought by Plaintiffs in this case. For example, Plaintiffs
sought the claims file, which contained the thoughts and impressions of the claims handlers, as
well as information regarding settlement value and any possible reserves set. Defendant was
placed in the position of having to comply with the court's order that it produce responses to the
discovery which could then be used by Plaintiffs to establish "legal entitlement" to the UM
benefits. This information would not be discoverable in connection with the UIM claim.
Discovery, therefore, should not have been permitted until Plaintiffs first established that they
were "legally entitled" to receive the UIM benefits under the policy.
The petition for interlocutory appeal was granted before "legal entitlement" was shown.
However, showing of "legal entitlement" is not synonymous with a finding of breach of contract
or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Rather, it further demonstrates
the need for the Court to outline the required analysis necessary in adjudicating a bad faith claim
after a finding of "legal entitlement" to the benefits under the policy. The policy provided a
procedure for resolution of questions of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, through arbitration.

11
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The claim was arbitrated, an award was made, and it was promptly paid by the insurance
company. The arbitrator's decision was not without reservation, for example the arbitrator had
questions regarding the cause of Byron Christiansen's relapse several months after the accident in
question. In addition, the arbitrator found that the settlement from the liability carrier was "a
reasonable amount to settle the case prior to the determination to have surgery", suggesting that
Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was not "legally entitled" to recover UIM benefits until the
determination to have surgery was made shortly before the arbitration. Thus, from the time the
matter was being evaluated, up until almost the date of arbitration, there could be no breach of
contract and therefore no breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The
arbitrator also found Plaintiff Byron Christiansen was not "legally entitled" to recover benefits
for lost wages. This is all suggestive that there was no breach of contract. This is further
corroborated by the arbitrator retaining jurisdiction over the matter in the event Mr. Christiansen
didn't have surgery, suggesting then that if he failed to show "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits
there could be no breach of contract or bad faith.
A finding of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits does not mean that a breach of contract
has now occurred. In order to have a breach of contract, as one of the essential elements,
Plaintiffs must show damages. In this regard, the only potential damage would be attorney's
fees. The significance of this is that the insurance policy expressly provides that attorney's fees
incurred in connection with an arbitration proceeding to determine "legal entitlement" to UIM

12
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benefits are to be paid by the party incurring them. Absent any evidence of damages, and in light
of the express contractual provisions stating that attorney's fees incurred in connection with
establishing "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, an award of attorney's fees would not be
appropriate. It follows then, that if the only damage Plaintiffs can show is attorney's fees, and
that is expressly excluded from the contract, there can be no breach of contract.
Finally, in the analysis of an insured's claim against his insurer, a determination that the
insured is "legally entitled" to UIM benefits and a finding that the insurance company has
breached its insurance contract, does not establish that the insurer breached the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. It is well established under Utah case law that: "If the evidence
presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a debatable reason for
denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad faith claim." Callioux
v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842 (Ut. App. 1987). If a plaintiff s claim is fairly
debatable, an insurance company should not be found to have breached the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. This suggests that if Plaintiffs first show "legal entitlement", then
breach, they still have to provide evidence of bad faith. This is especially the case since the
defense to a bad faith claim is whether the claim was arguably "fairly debatable".
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ARGUMENT
POINTI
PLAINTIFFS MUST SHOW "LEGAL ENTITLEMENT"
TO THE U M BENEFITS
The insurance policy in effect at the time of the loss determines whether there is
coverage. Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 532 (Ut. 2002). In this regard, the
Farmers policy, specifically the provisions for UIM benefits, provides as follows:
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of
bodily injury sustained by the insured driver while occupying your insured car.
(Second Edition, E-Z Reader Car Policy, Utah p. 8). (Emphasis added)
This provision is consistent with Utah law, U.C.A. §31A-22-305(9)(a), which provides
for underinsured motorist coverage "for covered persons who are "legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness, disease, or death." (Emphasis added.)
The meaning of "legally entitled" to recover damages has been addressed in numerous
Utah decisions. Further, case law in other jurisdictions suggests that this can be decided as a
matter of law. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Nacchia, 628 A.2d 48 (Del. 1993); Farmers
Alliance Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holeman, 961 P.2d 114 (Mt. 1998). The Utah Supreme Court
addressed the "legally entitled" to language for the first time in the case of Lyon v. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co., 480 P.2d 739 (Ut. 1971) (overruled on other grounds by Beck, supra).
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In Lyon, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the "legally entitled" to language of an uninsured
motorist provision of an insurance policy and stated that the insurer's obligations "did not arise
until there was a legal determination of the liability of the uninsured motorist and the extent of
the damages sustained." Id. at 744.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue again in Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279
(Ut. 1982) where, in the context of an uninsured motorist policy, it held that:
. . . [t]his showing of legal entitlement typically entails a lawsuit against the
uninsured tortfeasor to litigate the issues of liability and damages. A judgment
favorable to the insured fixes the insurer's contractual duty to satisfy that
judgment, within the policy limits.
M a t 281.
In 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted "legally entitled" to within the context of
underinsured motorist coverage in the case oi Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d
192 (Ut. App. 1996), where the court held that the insurer's obligation under UM and UIM
statutes (which are construed identically by the court in this context) did not arise until there is
"'a legal determination of liability of the [under-] insured motorist and the extent of the damages
sustained.'" 927 P.2d 192, 196, citing Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745. That legal determination is a
favorable judgment which fixes the insurance company's contractual duty.
More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals considered the "legally entitled" to recover
language of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in Estate ofBerkemeir ex rel. Nielsen
v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Midwest, 67 P.3d 1012 (Ut. App. 2003). Relying on the Utah Supreme
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Court's decision in Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Or., 15 P.3d 1030 (Ut. 2000), the court of
appeals chose not to adopt the more rigorous standard previously set forth in Peterson, Lima and
Lyon, but rather elected to use a less vigorous standard where the party need only show the
existence of a "viable claim that is able to be reduced to judgment". Id. at 1015. (Court's
emphasis.) Absent specific language to the contrary, such a showing is sufficient. This showing
can be made "with either a judgment entered by the trial court, or a formal, or informal,
settlement agreement between the parties." This appears to be a distinction without a difference.
In the Berkemeir case, the insurance company had agreed to settle the claim for uninsured
motorist coverage. The insurance company also informally acknowledged that the plaintiffs
injuries exceeded the uninsured motorist coverage, and agreed to determine the amount due
under UIM coverage through arbitration. When the plaintiff then died, the insurance company
reneged on the agreement to arbitrate.
In the case pending before the court, there had been no formal or informal settlement
agreement between Farmers and the Christiansens. Farmers had agreed to allow the
Christiansens to enter into a settlement agreement with the tortfeasor's carrier, but had not
admitted that the value of Plaintiffs' claim exceeded the amount which had already been paid to
them by the tortfeasor's carrier. Farmers sought to compel the Plaintiffs to resolve their claim for
UIM benefits in arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the insurance policy and to stay the
causes of action for breach of contract and bad faith pending a determination of whether
Plaintiffs were found to be "legally entitled" to UIM benefits in arbitration. Farmers argued that
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its duty to pay any UM benefits did not arise until there had been a determination of Plaintiffs'
"legal entitlement" to UIM benefits in arbitration (since the parties could not agree as to the value
of Plaintiffs' claims). Farmers argued that such a showing of "legal entitlement" to the contract
benefits, in turn, was a prerequisite to determining whether a breach of contract had occurred, a
prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action for bad faith.
A.

Under the Beck Case. Plaintiffs Must Still Establish "Legal Entitlemenfto UM Benefits
Before Pursuing a Bad Faith Claim.
Relying on the decision of this Court in Beck supra, Plaintiffs argue that they are not

required to establish that they are "legally entitled" to UM benefits before pursuing their claim
for bad faith. Although the Beck decision does state that under certain circumstances, a refusal to
bargain or settle, standing alone, may be sufficient to prove bad faith, it does so in the context of
the claimant in that case having already been determined to be "legally entitled" to uninsured
motorist benefits, a prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action for bad faith. Because such a
showing had not yet been made in this case, Farmers sought to stay Plaintiffs' claims for breach
of contract and bad faith.
In Beck, claimant made a policy limits demand for uninsured motorist benefits. The
insurance adjuster rejected the policy limits demand and the claimant then filed a lawsuit against
his own insurance carrier, alleging breach of the contract for refusing to pay his UM claim and
that, by refusing to investigate the claim, bargain with its insured, or settle, the insurance
company also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (bad faith). Claimant
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also alleged emotional distress. In Beck, the trial court bifurcated the case and agreed to try the
claim for failure to pay UM benefits independent of the bad faith claim. Subsequently, the
claimant and the insurance company agreed to settle the UM claim and that claim was dismissed.
Settlement of the claimant's UM claim established his "legal entitlement" to the UM benefits
under the contract. Estate ofBerkemeir, supra. The trial court then addressed the bad faith
claim.
It should also be noted that Beck differs from this case in that Beck involved a claim for
uninsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff in Beck claimed that he was forced to accept a
settlement of his uninsured motorist claim because he had essentially received nothing on behalf
of the uninsured tortfeasor. Plaintiffs in this case had, in fact, already been paid $50,000 on
behalf of the tortfeasor in addition to the no-fault benefits paid by Defendant and were seeking
additional amounts in UIM benefits. Defendant, in invoking the arbitration provisions of its
policy with Plaintiffs, maintained that Plaintiffs had not established that they were entitled to
additional compensation for any losses which they may have sustained or, if they were entitled to
additional compensation, how much they were entitled to. The "certain circumstances" which
might exist in a claim for uninsured motorist benefits like Beck, where a refusal to bargain or
settle, standing alone, might be sufficient to prove bad faith, simply do not exist in this case.
The Beck decision does not alter the fact that Plaintiffs must first establish that they are
"legally entitled" to UIM benefits. This is also supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in Chatterton. In that case, the plaintiff sought materials in discovery which were perhaps
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relevant to a bad faith claim against the insurance company. In rejecting the plaintiffs efforts to
obtain such materials, the court stated "[a]s it has not yet been determined whether State Farm is
liable for payment under the uninsured motorist provision, there is no ground upon which to
construct a case against State Farm for bad faith." (Emphasis added, citing Beck as support for
this proposition, Id. at 263.) In relying upon Beck, the court in Chatterton refused to allow
discovery in a potential bad faith claim absent first showing that plaintiff was "legally entitled" to
benefits alleged under the insurance contract.
Finally, Plaintiffs' position that Defendants' failure to respond to their settlement demand
is automatically bad faith, seemingly creates an independent tort and ignores the language in
Beck, which is undisputed, that afirstparty relationship is considered a contractual one, not one
in tort. Further, it seems to suggest that there can be strict liability for bad faith, which would
negate the "fairly debatable" defense. {Prince v. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, 56 P.3d
524, 535 (Ut. 2002). (See also point IV(A)).
POINTH
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM FOR BAD FAITH SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED
PENDING SHOWING A BREACH OF CONTRACT
According to the contract and Utah law, Farmers' duty to pay benefits under the contract
did not arise until Plaintiffs established that they were "legally entitled" to recover the benefits.
Because the parties in this case could not agree as to the value, if any, of Plaintiffs' UEVt claims,
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the contract specified that Plaintiffs were required to establish their "legal entitlement" to UIM
benefits through arbitration. Farmers' duty to pay did not arise until the arbitrator determined
that Plaintiffs were "legally entitled" to benefits under their insurance policy. While the trial
court properly ordered the determination of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits to be made in
arbitration and stayed Plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, it erroneously permitted the bad
faith claim to proceed. The trial court's action failed to take into account that the bad faith claim
in this case is a contract, not a tort claim, so that any claim for bad faith is predicated first on
showing "legal entitlement" to the benefits and, further, that the contract has been breached.
The Supreme Court in Beck, supra, distinguished between a first and third party
relationship, finding that afirstparty relationship, i.e. between the policyholder and the insurance
company, is contractual. Under Beck, this meant that an insured could not bring an action for bad
faith against his or her insurer, until a breach of that contract was established. Although the Beck
decision did contain language holding that the refusal to bargain or settle, standing alone, may,
under appropriate circumstances, be sufficient to prove a breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all contracts, this does not mean that in afirstparty relationship bad faith can
exist as an independent tort, especially since a defense to a claim of bad faith is whether the
refusal to bargain or settle is "fairly debatable". It is important to remember that, in Beck, the
claimant was already determined to be "legally entitled" to uninsured motorist (UM) benefits, a
prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action for breach of contract and bad faith.
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It is clear that the insureds may not just simply file a bad faith claim without having first
established that they are "legally entitled" to the contract benefits and, second, that the insurance
company breached the contract. See the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Chatterton, supra, in
which the court rejected the effort of a claimant to obtain discovery relevant only to a bad faith
actionfromhis own insurance carrier in connection with his claim for uninsured motorist
benefits. In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court refused to permit the claimant to obtain
"extensive discovery that he has conceded is primarily directed at exploring the possibility of
pursuing a bad faith claim" against his uninsured motorist carrier. The court stated: "[a]s it has
not vet been determined whether State Farm is liable for payment under the uninsured motorist
provision, there is no ground upon which to construct a case against State Farm for bad faith."
(Emphasis added.) (Citing Beck as support for this proposition.) Id. at 263.
Defendant's position that there must be a showing of breach of contract and not just a
failure by Defendant to pay what Plaintiff has demanded, is supported by cases in other
jurisdictions as well. These decisions reiterate that Plaintiffs must first establish that the
insurance contract has been breached before they are entitled to pursue their claim for bad faith.
In Imperial Casualty and Indemnity Co. v. Bellini, 746 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), the
insurance company sought to sever the bad faith claimfromthe claim for insurance coverage and
to limit discovery sought in connection with the bad faith claim. The Rhode Island Supreme
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Court agreed to sever the coverage issuesfromthe bad faith issues finding that the discovery
sought in connection with the bad faith claim should be deferred until plaintiff had established
the underlying breach of contract claim. In reaching this decision the court cited to its decision in
Bartlett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997 (R.I. 1988), wherein the court
stated:
There can be no cause of action for an insurer's badfaith [sic] refusal to pay a
claim until the insured first establishes that the insurer breached its duty under the
contract of insurance.... If the insurer prevails on the breach of contract action,
it could not, as a matter of law, have acted in bad faith in its relationship with its
policyholder. There cannot be a showing of bad faith when the insurer is able to
demonstrate a reasonable basis for denying benefits.
Bartlett 2X1000.
Moreover, the Rhode Island court agreed with the reasoning in Bartlett that "allowing full
disclosure of the insurer's claims file based solely on plaintiffs allegation of bad faith would
invite all plaintiffs to include a bad faith claim with every breach of contract claim." Id. at 134
(citing Bartlett). The Rhode Island Supreme Court did acknowledge that the claims file may
provide information to prove a bad faith claim, but determined that the need for this information
"is outweighed first by the insurer's right to defend itself against the breach of contract claim and
second by the fact that a bad faith claim cannot be maintained until the plaintiff proves that the
insurer breached its contract of insurance." Id. at 135.
In O'Malley v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 776 F.2d 494 (U.S.C.A. 5th Cir. Miss. 1985),
O'Malley brought suit against his insurance company, alleging breach of contract and bad faith
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by failing to properly investigate the claim and pay for losses. The insurer denied liability
pursuant to an exclusionary clause in the insurance contract. The district court bifurcated the
trial, hearing evidence and testimony only on the issue of whether the losses were covered by the
policy because plaintiff could not have recovered on the bad faith claim unless he prevailed on
the contract claim. O'Malley appealed and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
decision to bifurcate, reasoning that"... recovery on the bad faith claim would not have been
possible unless O'Malley prevailed on his coverage claim." Id. 501.
In South Hampton Refining Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. 875 F. Supp. 382 (E.D.
Tex. 1995) plaintiff brought claims against National Union for breach of contract, negligence,
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Texas
Insurance Code. With respect to these claims, the court determined that severance was
appropriate and, in doing so, the court held that "in insurance coverage suits, a plaintiffs bad
faith claims generally depend on the outcome of contractual coverage claims and are usually
severed." Id. 384. More specifically:
The court also noted that plaintiffs bad faith claims, a violation of the Insurance
Code claims and Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims all depended on the
outcome of the contractual coverage dispute, (cit.) The court further ordered an
abatement of all other claims pending resolution of the contractual coverage issues
Id. at 384 (citing with approval U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W.2d 668, 672 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1993)) (emphasis added).
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A series of cases in Florida asserting a statutory action for bad faith against an insurance
company have held that it is premature to file such an action for bad faith until there has been a
determination of liability and the extent of damages owed on the first party insurance contract.
The Florida Supreme Court, addressing questions of Florida law certified by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an insured's claim against his uninsured
motorist carrier's failure to settle his uninsured motorist claim in good faith did not accrue before
the conclusion of the underlying litigation for the contractual uninsured motorist benefits. A
series of subsequent Florida district court decisions reiterated this point and held that the bad
faith claims raised by insureds against their insurance company for failure to settle should
alternatively be dismissed without prejudice or abated pending resolution of the coverage issues.
Moreover, these decisions halted discovery related to issues pertaining to the insured's claim of
bad faith against their insurance companies. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farm, Inc., 754 So.2d
865 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2000) where the court held that bringing an action for statutory bad faith
was premature before a determination of coverage and the amount of damages owed under the
policy (citing Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 1270, 1276 (Fla. 2000)). See also General
Starlndem. Co. v. Anheuser Busch Companies, Inc., 741 So.2d 1259 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1999)
(comparing a third party bad faith to first party bad faith cause of action and reiterating the
necessity of resolving coverage and liability issues first and that no discovery on the bad faith
claim should proceed until coverage has been resolved); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Baughman, 741 So.
2d 624 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1999) (the statutory bad faith claim for failure to settle an insurance
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claim should have been dismissed without prejudice or, alternatively, abated); and Doan v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 400 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1999) (resolution of coverage
dispute on disability insurance claim necessary before deciding bad faith claim). See also Talat
Enterprises, Inc. v. Aetna Life and Cas., 952 F. Supp. 773 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Michigan Millers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bourke, 581 So.2d 1368 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1991); and Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Melendez, 550 So.2d 156 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1989).
In the case of Walden v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 951 P.2d 949 (Id. 1998), the insured
brought a cause of action against her uninsured motorist carrier for breach of contract and bad
faith. The insured had submitted a "proof of loss" to her insurer and demanded the policy limits
under the UM portion of her policy. The insurer responded and indicated it did not believe her
claim was a limits case and demanded arbitration. The insurance company advised plaintiffs
counsel of the name of the arbitrator it wished to designate. The plaintiff, however, did not
designate her own arbitrator but instead filed suit against the insurance company alleging breach
of contract for failing to pay "an amount justly due." The policy contained a similar provision to
that contained in the Farmers policy issued to Plaintiffs in this case, providing for "arbitration in
the event that the insurance company and the insured do not agree about the insured's right to
recover damages or the amount of the damages." The court found that the insurance company
was entitled, pursuant to the terms of its policy, to have the amount of damages determined in
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arbitration. It held that the insurance company was not in breach of contract and did not act in
bad faith in relying on the contractual provisions for arbitration.
The Federal District Court in Nevada in the case of Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 960 F. Supp. 233 (D. Ne. 1997), reviewed Nevada case law and that of other jurisdictions
involving uninsured motorist coverage and bad faith claims and found that a majority of
jurisdictions hold that a bad faith claim either does not exist or should be held in abeyance until
there is a final resolution of the contractual coverage claim. Citing, for example, Blanchard v.
State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 575 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1991).
Similar decisions have been reached by the Court of Appeals in Georgia. In the case of
Wallis v. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 354 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. App. 1987), the parents of a man who
died from injuries incurred in a collision with an uninsured motorist filed a demand for payment
with their son's uninsured motorist carrier. Georgia's bad faith statute required uninsured
motorist benefits to be paid within 60 days after demand for payment was made, However, the
court held that the insurer was not liable for bad faith penalties for failure to pay within the 60
days where the demand was made prior to entry of judgment against the uninsured motorist, but
noted that since the insurer is liable for the amount which the insured "shall be legally entitled to
recover" from the uninsured motorist, liability for damages "should be ascertained in an
appropriate forum before bringing the suit against the insurance company under such coverage."
Id. at 843. It further stated that:
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. . . an insurer has no duty to accept an insured's demand for payment of a claim
prior to judgment being entered against an uninsured motorist. Inasmuch as the
insurer is not required to make payment or settlement, it defies logic to argue that
[the insurer] could have acted in bad faith in failing to pay the claim prior to
judgment in the tort case.
Id. at 843 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCall, 305 S.E.2d 413 (Ga. App. 1983). See also Jones v.
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co., 363 S.E.2d 303 (Ga. App. 1987).
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Chatterton firmly establishes that Plaintiffs in this
case could not pursue their cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing (bad faith) until they had established that they were "legally entitled" to the contract
benefits. In addition, for the reasons set forth in Point HI below, pending a showing by Plaintiffs
that they are first "legally entitled" to benefits under the contract and, second, that there has been
a breach of contract, the claim for bad faith should be stayed since failure to do so is not only
improper but also prejudices the insurance company.
POINT m
DISCOVERY IN A BAD FAITH ACTION IS INAPPROPRIATE UNTIL
PLAINTIFFS HAVE SHOWN THAT THEY ARE "LEGALLY ENTITLED" TO
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS
In this case, in connection with their efforts to establish a claim for bad faith against
Defendant, Plaintiffs have sought information pertaining to the liability and valuation which
Defendant might have made concerning Plaintiffs' UIM claim. This information, if produced
prior to the determination of Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, prejudices Defendant
in the then still-pending arbitration. In seeking the stay of the bad faith action and protection
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from Plaintiffs' discovery requests, Defendant had argued that since Plaintiffs' entitlement to
UIM benefits and if, in fact, entitled to such benefits, how much they were entitled to, had yet to
be resolved, Defendant should not be prejudiced in the resolution of Plaintiffs' UIM claims by
being forced to proceed with the discovery requests made in connection with Plaintiffs' bad faith
claim against Defendant. As noted by this court in Beck, supra, Defendant argued that with
regard to Plaintiffs' first party claim for UIM benefits, Plaintiffs and Defendant were "in effect
and practically speaking, adversaries." Id. 799.
The court's decision in Chatteron, supra, made clear that discovery in a bad faith case is
inappropriate until Plaintiffs have shown "legal entitlement" to the contract benefits. As
indicated earlier, the court there refused to allow plaintiffs discovery requests directed at
exploring the possibility of a bad faith claim against an insurance company until it was first
determined that the insurance company was liable under the uninsured motorist provisions of its
policy.
The position taken by the court in Chatterton, supra, is consistent with that taken by the
Texas Court of Appeals in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W. 2d 260 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1992), wherein the court addressed issues raised by trying an uninsured motorist claim with
a claim for bad faith and an insurance company's plea to abate the bad faith claim until the
uninsured motorist claim was resolved. The court recognized that information pertaining to
offers of settlement and compromise would be inadmissible under Rule 408 of the Texas (and
Utah) Rules of Evidence in the resolution of an uninsured motorist claim, yet this same
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information was sought as the basis for plaintiffs bad faith claim against defendant. The court
noted that information such as offers to settle sought in connection with bad faith litigation
would not be admissible in connection with resolution of an uninsured motorist claim since the
basic rule that settlement offers are not admissible to show liability for or the invalidity of a
claim or its amount would be violated. In order to allow both the claim for UIM benefits and the
claim for bad faith to be fully and fairly litigated, the court reversed the trial court's decision and
severed the two causes of action, abating all proceedings on the bad faith cause of action until
final disposition on the uninsured motorist claim. See also Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Texas v.
Lerner, 901 S.W. 2d 749 (Tex. Ct. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), wherein the Texas Court of
Appeals held that "the breach of contract claim and the extracontractual bad faith claims must be
severed. In addition, the bad faith claims must be abated until the breach of contract issue is
finally resolved for all purposes." See also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Millard, 847 S.W. 2d 668 (Tex.
Ct. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1993) wherein the court "directed the trial court to sever and abate
all proceedings on the bad faith claims pending full and final resolution of plaintiff s uninsured
motorist claim." Id. 676. See also Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Stem, 927 S.W. 2d 76, 80 (Tex. Ct.
App. Waco 1996) wherein the court agreed with the holding in Wilborn and determined that the
defendant [insurance company] "would necessarily be prejudiced in his defense of the plaintiffs
contract claim if evidence of settlement offers was admitted" and, for this reason, upheld the
holding in Wilborn (wherein they agreed with the bifurcation of the entitlement to underinsured
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motorist benefits from the bad faith claim and abated all proceedings of the bad faith pending a
final disposition of the underinsured motorist claim.) Part of the reason for doing so was
predicated on the admission of evidence possibly relevant to a bad faith action, but that would be
highly prejudicial in a determination of UIM benefits. Specifically referred to were offers of
settlement, which may establish an admission of liability, as well as value.
In the case of General Star Indemnity Co. v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., supra, the Florida
Court of Appeals noted that for both first and third party bad faith claims against insurers,
coverage and liability issues must be determined before bad faith can be prosecuted. It noted that
"failure to follow this procedure would, in effect, reverse the established case law that discovery
of an insured's claim file is not permissible until the insured's obligation to provide coverage has
been established" and that the insurer would be "irreparably harmed" by having to litigate the bad
faith claim with the coverage claim because the evidence used to prove the bad faith claim would
prejudice "the coverage issue." Id. at 1261. Discovery was similarly stayed in Michigan Millers
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bourke, supra, in which the court found that a claim for bad faith did not
accrue until after liability and damages were determined in the underlying contractual litigation
and abating the bad faith claim against the uninsured motorist carrier, and quashed the order
compelling discovery of the insurance company's claims file.
The inherent prejudice resultingfromthe trial court's refusal to stay the bad faith
litigation in this case, and ordering Defendant to respond to discovery sought in connection with
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the bad faith claim prior to resolution of the UIM claim was demonstrated in this case. Plaintiffs
sought the claims file which contains the thoughts and impressions of the claims handlers and
has information concerning liability and damages, as well as information regarding settlement
value, including the reserves set. Defendant was in the untenable position of having to comply
with the court's order that it produce responses to discovery which would be used by Plaintiffs to
then bolster their showing of "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits. This is exactly the prejudice
sought to be avoided by staying litigation in the bad faith claim until the UIM claims were
resolved. Defendant, an insurance company against whom a bad faith claim was asserted, should
not have been required to comply with discovery requests which may have been proper in
connection with their bad faith claim, but which addressed issues concerning settlement and
valuation of the claim, as well as liability, and which would not be discoverable in connection
with the UIM claims. Discovery should not be held on those issues until Plaintiffs first
established that they were "legally entitled" to receive UIM benefits under the insurance contract
and then establish breach of that contract.
POINT IV
DETERMINATION OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENT BY THE ARBITRATOR DOES NOT
ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANT BREACHED THE INSURANCE CONTRACT OR THE
IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
Inasmuch aslhe arbitration award issued after this Court granted Defendant's Petition to
Appeal Interlocutory Order established Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits, it is
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important for this Court to outline the required analysis to be made after a finding of "legal
entitlement" to benefits under the policy. Because Plaintiffs have now been awarded UIM
benefits in the December, 2003 arbitration, this does not establish that Defendant breached the
insurance contract or that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover on their claim for bad faith. As
indicated earlier, the contract between the parties, the insurance policy issued by Farmers to
Plaintiffs, provided that Farmers pay UIM benefits to its insureds who were "legally entitled" to
recover damages from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle. The policy
further provided for arbitration to establish "legal entitlement" to underinsured motorist benefits
when such benefits could not be agreed upon among the parties. The insurance policy issued to
Plaintiffs provides as follows:
If an insured person and we do not agree (1) that the person is
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of
an uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor vehicle, or
(2) as to the amount of damages Uninsured or Underinsured
Motorist Coverage, either party may make a written demand for
arbitration.
In that event, both parties will agree on one arbitrator. If they
cannot agree within 30 days, either may request that selection be
made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. We will pay the
costs of the arbitrator. Attorney's fees and fees paid for the
witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the
party incurring them.

The arbitrator will determine (1) the existence of an uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicle, (2) that the insured person is
legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of
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an uninsured motor vehicle, and (3) the amount of payment under
this part as determined by this policy or any other applicable
policy....
In this case, the parties could not agree as to Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement" to UIM
benefits or, if entitled, the amount. As evidenced by the arbitrator's award in this matter, the
arbitrator was unclear as to what caused Plaintiff Byron Christiansen's relapse several months
subsequent to the accident in question. Moreover, his decision indicates that Plaintiff was not
"legally entitled" to recover underinsured motorist benefits until the determination to have
surgery was made. (No indication is given as to when this determination was made. However,
the surgery was apparently scheduled to take place sometime during the week after the December
8, 2003 award was issued.) The arbitrator devised a formula for apportioning the proximate
cause of Plaintiff s injuries and surgery to the various possible causes and applied that percentage
to the cost of Plaintiff s surgery and the resulting general damages associated with Plaintiff
undergoing that surgery. Although there was no confirmation that Plaintiff did, in fact, elect to
undergo the surgery, Farmers promptly paid Plaintiffs' claim for UIM benefits.
The facts as they have been developed at this point do not suggest that there has been any
breach of contract by Farmers. Plaintiffs were required to produce evidence that they were
"legally entitled" to recover UIM benefits. The record contains no evidence that they satisfied
their burden of establishing "legal entitlement" until the arbitrator issued his award on December
8, 2003. In fact, the arbitrator's decision indicates that Plaintiffs failed to establish "legal
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entitlement" to compensation for lost wages, evidence of which Farmers counsel had evidently
been seekingfromthem since the fall of 2002 when he wasfirstretained to handle the claim.
Moreover, according to the arbitrator, the settlement from the liability carrier was "a reasonable
amount to settle the case prior to the determination to have surgery."
Not persuaded that Plaintiffs had established their "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits,
Farmers invoked the arbitration provision pursuant to its insurance contract with Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs agreed to arbitrate the claim and were awarded and promptly paid UIM benefits
pursuant to the arbitrator's decision. There is no evidence of any breach of contract by Farmers.
An insurance company is not required to pay every claim submitted to it.
A.

Plaintiffs Cannot Establish the Elements to Show Breach of Contract.
One of the necessary elements to establish a breach of contract is damages. In this

regard, arguably the only damages Plaintiffs can claim are attorney's fees in having to arbitrate
their claim to show "legal entitlement" to the UIM benefits. It should be noted that the insurance
policy expressly provides that any attorney's fees incurred in connection with an arbitration
proceeding to determine "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits would be paid by the party incurring
them. This is important because the remedy for breach of the express terms of an insurance
contract has been deemed in some Utah cases to include foreseeable attorney's fees. (Canyon
Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Ut. 1989); Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d
461 (Ut. 1996)). Although Utah cases have awarded foreseeable attorney's fees as consequential
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damages flowing from an insurer's breach of the express terms of an insurance contract,
Defendant maintains that it has not breached the contract, that attorney's fees incurred because
Plaintiffs failed to produce evidence to establish their "legal entitlement" to UIM benefits were
not contemplated at the time the parties entered into the insurance contract, and, most
importantly, if any fees were awarded, the court would be rewriting the insurance policy to
require the insurer to assume attorney's fees incurred by the insureds in producing evidence of
"legal entitlement" to benefits, notwithstanding that the contract expressly provides otherwise.
This being the case, Plaintiffs do not show that they have been damaged, and therefore cannot
meet the elements to show that the insurance contract has been breached. If there is no breach of
contract, there can be no bad faith claim.
B.

The Arbitration Award Does Not Establish Breach of the Implied Covenant Of Good
Faith And Fair Dealing (Bad Faith).
The arbitrator's award of UIM benefits to Plaintiffs in this case does not establish that

Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing any more than it
establishes that it breached the insurance contract. It is well established under Utah case law that
"if the evidence presented creates a factual issue as to the claim's validity, there exists a
debatable reason for denial, thereby legitimizing the denial of the claim, and eliminating the bad
faith claim. 'When a claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to debate it, whether the
debate concerns a matter of fact or law.'" Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 842
(Ut. App. 1987) (quoting McLaughlin v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 437 So.2d
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86, 90 (Ala. 1983)). See also Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 56 P.3d 524, 535 (Ut. 2002),
where the court held that if an insured's claim is "fairly debatable", then the insurer is entitled to
debate the claim and "cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do
so." (citing Morris v. HealthNet of California, Inc., 988 P.2d 940 (Ut. 1999); Billings v. Union
Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Ut. 1996); Callioux v. Progressive Ins. Co., supra at 842.)
In Prince, supra, an insured brought an action for breach of contract, bad faith,
intentional infliction of emotional distress,fraud,and tortious violation of public policy against
his automobile insurer because the insurance company, relying on an independent medical
examiner's report that continued chiropractic care was not medically necessary, discontinued PIP
payments to the insured. Finding that there was a factual issue as to the validity of the plaintiffs
claims for continued PIP benefits, the court held that the claim was "fairly debatable" and the
denial of benefits did not "constitute a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as a
matter of law." Quoting Couch on Insurance 3d §204:28 (1999), the court in Prince stated that
"a debatable reason" for purposes of determining whether a first party insurer may be subjected
to bad faith liability means "an arguable reason, a reason that is open to dispute or question." It
further stated that "to be fairly debatable, evidence must establish that there is an arguable or
debatable basis underlying the insurer's nonpayment or delayed payment of a claim." Prince,
supra at 537.
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This Court in Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461 (Ut. 1996) examined
whether a first party insurer could be held liable for breaching the implied covenant on the
grounds that it wrongfully denied coverage if the insured's claim was later found to be proper.
The court noted that if the insurer acted reasonably in dealing with their insureds, "it is entirely
consistent... to hold that when an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is entitled to
debate it and cannot be held to have breached the implied covenant if it chooses to do so." Id.
465. In a footnote, the court sought to clarify this in light of Beck, noting that although Beck,
supra, stated that the "state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant; even an inadvertent breach of the
covenant of good faith implied in an insurance contract can substantially harm the insured and
warrants a remedy," this statement should not be read as suggesting that the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing imposes a strict liability standard. The court stated that the language in the
Beck decision did not mean that:
if a claim is denied and a court later determines it should have been granted, the
insurer is liable for breaching the implied covenant, regardless of how reasonable
it was to deny coverage. On the contrary, this statement in Beck was intended
only to disavow any implication that a "bad faith" state of mind is necessary to
show a breach of the implied covenant, not to impose strict liability on insurers.
Id. 465.
The record here does not contain extensive facts concerning the underlying claim of
Plaintiffs against Farmers. The file as it exists, however, does contain evidence that Plaintiffs'
claim was "fairly debatable." The arbitrator's decision notes that Plaintiff Byron Christiansen
had been paid $4,750 in lost wages by Defendant under the PIP portion of his insurance policy.
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The record on pages 76-80 indicates that income tax returns sought by Farmers to evaluate
Plaintiffs' claim for UM benefits were belatedly provided on the morning of Plaintiff s
scheduled sworn statement. The arbitrator's decision notes in paragraph 7 that "petitioner has
not proven an income loss in the past or future as a result of the motor vehicle accident." The
arbitrator's decision states in paragraph 5 that "the settlement from the liability carrier is a
reasonable amount to settle the case prior to the determination to have surgery." When Plaintiff
made his determination to have surgery is not indicated in the award, but it does note that the
surgery was scheduled for the week following the December 8, 2003 arbitration award. The
award also provides a rather detailed description of Plaintiff s pre-existing non-symptomatic
degenerative condition at the time of the accident, the accident exacerbating the degenerative
condition, causing it to become symptomatic, Plaintiffs improvement with conservative care,
and then his significant relapse due to reasons which were unclear to the arbitrator but which may
have included "a long airplane ride, too much activity at a wedding reception, or coughing from
pneumonia." According to the arbitrator, "any of these events could have triggered the relapse
and each may be as traumatic as this very minor automobile collision." The court then devises a
formula for apportioning the proximate cause of Plaintiff s injuries among his pre-existing
condition, the unclear triggering mechanism of July, 2001 and the subject automobile accident.
The fact that Plaintiff failed to establish any claim for additional lost wages, that until he made a
determination to have surgery he had been fully compensated by the settlement with the insurer
of the underlying tortfeasor, and that the surgery to address his ongoing pain followed an unclear
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triggering mechanism subsequent to the motor vehicle accident are all evidence that this claim
was "fairly debatable" and that Defendant was therefore entitled to fairly debate the claim.
In Prince, supra, the court outlined the implied promises of good faith and fair dealing
that both parties to an insurance contract make. The court stated that "under this covenant, the
contracting parties each impliedly promise not to 'intentionally or purposefully do anything [that]
will destroy or injure the other party's right to receive thefruitsof the contract." Id. 533 (quoting
Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Ut. 1998)). It is also noted that under this covenant, the
insurer was required to diligently investigate the facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is
valid and to fairly evaluate the claim. It is apparent in this mutual covenant imposed on both
parties to the contract that Plaintiffs must provide the evidence to support their claim for benefits.
In this case, although Plaintiffs had claimed lost wages, they never successfully substantiated this
claim. Moreover, the history of Plaintiffs discomfort was a rather complicated one with a relapse
triggered by unclear mechanisms. Although the accident in question in this case occurred on
May 10, 2001, surgery was not scheduled until December, 2003. The arbitrator noted that
Plaintiff was not entitled to interest on the medical specials of $49,735 for surgical costs, as they
had not yet been incurred. At the very least, Plaintiffs claim was still evolving at the time that it
was filed with Defendant in August, 2002 and the diligence with which Defendant could evaluate
Plaintiffs' claims was dependent in part on Plaintiffs timely providing information in support of
their claim. Once the decision of the arbitrator was rendered on December 8, 2003, Defendant
promptly paid the claim pursuant to its obligation under the contract.
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In the case of Calliowc, supra, the plaintiffs' insurer denied their claim for a total loss of
their vehicle after its investigator and an arson expert concluded that the loss was caused by a
fire. The claimant was subsequently charged with arson in connection with his alleged
destruction of the Jeep and for his subsequent attempt to defraud an insurer. After a finding of
probable cause, the claimant was bound over for trial. The jury found claimant not guilty, and
the insurance company immediately paid the claim in full. In finding the insurance company
acted in good faith, the court noted that upon the claimant's acquittal for arson and insurance
fraud, the insurance company paid the claim in full. Similarly, in this case, the insurance
company promptly paid the benefits owing once a finding of "legal entitlement" to the UIM
benefits was made by the arbitrator, having debated a fairly debatable claim. It follows then, that
an award from the arbitrator, standing alone, is not evidence of bad faith. Rather, in the claim
here, which was "fairly debatable", Defendant should not be found to have breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This also negates Plaintiffs' position that the controlling
language in the Beck case, which suggests that an insurance company's refusal to bargain, and/or
accept or reject a settlement, is bad faith. The case law clearly suggests that if the claim is
deemed "fairly debatable" the insurance company is entitled to debate it and it forms an
affirmative defense to Plaintiffs' allegations of bad faith.
Absent a breach of the express terms of the contract and absent a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, no damages are properly awardable. The UIM benefits
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were promptly paid upon the arbitrator's determination of "legal entitlement." No interest was
awarded as the special damages had not yet been incurred and attorney's fees incurred to produce
evidence of "legal entitlement" are expressly excluded by the contract, are not provided for in the
UIM statute, and were not contemplated at the time of contracting.
CONCLUSION
The trial court in this case was incorrect in allowing the bad faith claim against Defendant
to proceed, before Plaintiffs showed that they were "legally entitled" to recover UIM benefits.
Further, the trial court was incorrect in its ruling staying the breach of contract action and still
allowing the bad faith action to go forward, since there must be a showing of breach of contract
before a cause of action for bad faith can be maintained against the insurance carrier. It was also
in error in allowing discovery which may be pertinent to a bad faith action to go forward, because
it may cause discovery of information that may be relevant to a bad faith claim and highly
prejudicial to the arbitration of the UIM claim. For example, the claims file would contain the
thoughts and impressions of the claims handler, settlement authority, and the setting of reserves,
all of which would assist Plaintiffs during the course of the arbitration to determine liability and
damages.
The policy itself and Utah law offer a systematic process for analyzing claims filed by an
insured against his or her insurance carrier. To ignore the requirements of this process by
allowing claims for bad faith to be filed with every claim for UIM benefits would create a
situation where insureds would find it advantageous to file a bad faith lawsuit while
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simultaneously seeking UIM benefits, as well as attorney's fees, every time their demand was not
met by an insurance company, notwithstanding the fact that they failed to fulfill their
responsibilities to establish "legal entitlement" to such benefits under the contract.
Defendant therefore requests that this Court find that the claimant must first show "legal
entitlement" to the benefits, and that a finding of "legal entitlement" does not equate with breach
of contract or breach of the implied covenant. This being the case, Defendant requests that this
Court grant a stay of the bad faith action, pending a determination of whether there has been
a breach of contract. Defendant also requests this Court stay all discovery related to the bad faith
claim pending resolution of the breach of contract claim.
DATED this

of March, 2004.

BARBARA L. M A W
ANDREA C. ALCABES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the £- ' day of March, 2004, two copies of the foregoing BRIEF
OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE ON THE
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, HONORABLE
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. was mailed,first-classpostage prepaid, to the following:
Scott D. Brown
Brian S. Coutts
NUTTALL, BROWN AND ASSOCIATES
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 210
Midvale,UT 84047-4198
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INDEX TO ADDENDUM
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Plaintiffs' Motion to Set Aside Permission for Interlocutory Appeal Due to Change in
Circumstances

2.

Utah Code Annotated §31A-22-305~ "Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage1
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SCOTT D. BROWN, ESQ. #4280
BRIAN S. COUTTS, ESQ. #8163
NUTTALL, BROWN AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 210
Midvale, Utah 84047-4198
Telephone: (801) 255-2102

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BYRON CHILD CHRISTIANSEN and
MERRILEE CHRISTIANSEN, husband
and wife,

MOTION TO SET ASIDE PERMISSION
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL DUE
TO CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
Vo.

Appellate Court No. 20030836-SC
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
District Court No. 030908140
Defendant/Petitioner.

Plaintiffs/Respondents, Byron and Merrilee Christiansen, by and through their attorneys, submit
this Motion to Set Aside Permission for Interlocutory Appeal due to a significant change in the
circumstances on which the permission was based.
Attached as Exhibit One is a copy of Arbitrator Scott Daniels' Arbitration Award in the
amount of approximately $75,000.00, dated December 8, 2003; together with Farmers' check and the
fully executed Satisfaction of Arbitration Award.
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Interestingly, notice of the above Award was received just the day after the Utah Supreme Court
issued its December 10, 2003 Order (attached as Exhibit Two), granting permission to Petitioner
Farmers to file an Interlocutory Appeal of Third District Coun Judge Joseph Fratto's denial of
Farmers' Motion to Stay the Bad Faith action, pending resolution of the Arbitration of the written
contractual underinsured motorist claim. (Judge Fratto's Order attached as Exhibit Three).
It is Plaintiffs'/Respondents' understanding that the Arbitration Award renders moot any
otherwise forthcoming Interlocutory Appeal. If there was any need to demonstrate "legal entitlement"
to UIM benefits before proceeding on the bad faith claim, the substantial Arbitration Award satisfies
that. The final resolution of the arbitration also removes any potential for one side of the case to
prejudice the other. Furthermore, any urgency that may have warranted an interlocutory appeal no
longer exists. In the Arbitration, Plaintiffs' prevailed on their cause of action for Farmers' breach of
the written contractual underinsured motorist policy provisions. The only remaining claims are those
in litigation for breach of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing (i.e., bad faith).
Consequently, it would be a waste of this Court's resources to proceed to enforce a now meaningless
stay, and to administer an Interlocutory Appeal which has now been rendered moot by virtue of the
resolution of the Arbitration confirming Plaintiffs' "legal entitlement".
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs'/Respondents' respectfully request that permission to
pursue the Interlocutory Appeal be reversed, and that proceedings be allowed to go forward in the
ordinary course in the breach of the contractual duties of good faith and fair dealing action pending
before Judge Fratto in the Third Judicial District Court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

^

day of December, 2003.

SCOTT D. BROWN, ESQ.
NUTTALL, BROWN AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents
Bvron and Merrilee Christiansen

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of December, 2003, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO SET ASIDE PERMISSION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL DUE
TO CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES was mailed via First-Class Mail to the following:
Attorney Barbara L. Maw
Law Offices of Barbara L. Maw, P.C.
185 South State Street, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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In the Matter of the Arbitration Between:
Byron Christiansen
and Merrilee Christiansen

AWARD OF ARBITRATOR
Case number 03-A-084

-andFarmers Insurance

The undersigned arbitrator, having been designated in accordance with the arbitration
agreement signed by the parties and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the parties,
FINDS AND AWARDS as follows:
1.
Petitioner (hereinafter "Petitioner" will refer to Mr. Christiansen) was involved in a
rear end motor vehicle accident on May 10, 2001. Respondent is the underinsured motorist
carrier. The adverse driver's liability carrier paid its policy limit of $50,000. In addition PIP paid
petitioner $3000 in medical payments and $4750 in lost wages.
2.
Petitioner has incurred $15,735.20 in medical costs as a result of the accident. In
addition, it is anticipated that he will need cervical surgery which will cost $49,735. This surgery
is scheduled for next week.
3.
Petitioner had a pre-existing, non-symptomatic, degenerative cervical condition at
the time of the accident. The accident aggravated this condition, lighting it up, and causing it to
become symptomatic. Petitioner's condition improved with conservative care over the months
following the accident, but he never returned to pre-accident status. By July 18, 2001 he had
improved considerably. At the end of July and into August of 2001, Petitioner suffered a
significant relapse. It is unclear what the triggering mechanism for this relapse was. It may have
been a long airplane ride, too much activity at a wedding reception, or coughing from pneumonia.
Any of these events could have triggered the relapse, and each may be as traumatic as this very
minor automobile collision. In any event, Petitioner has continued to experience more pain from
this time and the evidence indicates that the cause of the problem now is a combination of the preexisting degenerative disc disease, the automobile accident and whatever triggered the July 2001
set back.
4.
Although the Biswell case would indicate that when a condition is aggravated by a
traumatic incident, the subsequent trauma is the sole proximate cause of the injury, subsequent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

case law has modified this to the extent that a trier of fact can allocate causation. See Tingy v.
Christensen 987 P.2d 588 (1999).
5.
The settlement from the liability carrier is a reasonable amount to settle the case
prior to the determination to have surgery. Prior to the July 2001 point, the only proximate cause
of the injury was presumed to be the motor vehicle accident. Petitioner had incurred about
$15,000 in medical expenses. He had undergone considerable pain and suffering, especially in
wearing a brace for several months in an attempt to stabilize his neck. The settlement did not
compensate him for the set back that occurred in July of 2001 and persists to the present time.
6.
The accident was- 50% responsiblefor the:neededfiitiire:surgery. The pre-existing
condition and the triggering mechanism of July 2001 are 50% responsible for the need for
surgery.
7.
Petitioner has not proven an income loss in the past or future as a result of the
motor vehicle accident.
8.
Petitioner is entitled to general damages as a result of the surgery. Included in the
general damage figure is Mrs. Christiansen's loss as a result of having to work more in the
business, as well as Petitioner's loss of enjoyment of life, pain and suffering associated with the
surgery and recovery, future medical,fiitaiEadisahility.andfuture loss of household services. This
general damage amount is $100,000.
9.
Petitioner is not entitled to interest on the medical specials, in that they have not
yet been incurred.
10.
The arbitrator will retain jurisdiction to modify the Award if Petitioner determines
not to have the scheduled surgery. Upjess the parties reqviest return of the medical records in the
Arbitrator's possession, they will be destroyed within 30 days.
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Award:
Cost of Surgery

$49,735.00

General Damages

100,000

Sub Total
X XA

149,735.00

TOTAL AWARD

$74,867.50
DATED this 8th of December, 2003

Scott Daniels
Arbitrator

m\

'6id&

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Scott Daniels, certify that I served the foregoing Award of Arbitrator upon the parties by
mailing to:
Mr. Scott D. Brown
Nuttall & Brown
6925 Union Park Center #210
Midvale, UT 84047

Mr. Michael Hanson
215 S. State St. #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

First class, postage prepaid, on the 8th day of December 2003
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J. Michael Hansen, Esq. USB No. 1339
of and for
NELSON, CHIPMAN, QUIGLEY & HANSEN
Attorneys for Respondent
215 South State Street, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)364-3627
ARBITRATION

BYRON C. CHRISTIANSEN,

SATISFACTION OF ARBITRATION AWARD

Claimant,
vs.
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
Respondent.

Case No. 03-A084
Arbitrator: Scott Daniels

An Award of Arbitrator was entered in this matter on December 8, 2003, in the sum of
$74,867.50. Full and complete satisfaction of the Award of Arbitrator has been received.
DATED this / <

day of December 2003.
NUTTALL, BROWN & ASSOCIATES

SCOTT D. BROWN
Attorney for Claimant
STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /cT"day of December, 2003.
sr-.rkZ"""""""Notary Public
"I
r*
,/$£S^
REBECCA T.DUNCAN ,
,

aj f?{><&*£&* Wi 8925 Union Park Center, Suite 2101

s

}«

v

,.,
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Byron Child Christiansen and
Merrilee Christiansen, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
No. 20030836-SC
030908140

v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange,
Defendant and Petitioner.

ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Permission to
Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to Rule 5 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to Appeal
an Interlocutory Order filed on October 17, 2003 is granted.

For The C o u r t :

k/umlw /0/ 7M 7
Date

>

Christine M. Durham
Chief Justice
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EXHIBIT
THREE
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In The Third Judicial District Court Of Salt Lake County
State of Utah
BYRON CHILD CHRISTIANSEN
MERRILEE CHRISTIANSEN,

NOTICE OF DECISION

Plaintiff,
Judge: Joseph C Fratto, Jr
vs.

Case No. 030908140

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
Defendant.

RE: Plaintiffs Rule 37 Motion for Order Compelling Discovery;
Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay breach of
Contract, Bad Faith and Associated Causes; Defendant's Motion for Protective
Order pursuant to Rule 26(c).

See attached decision.
Dated this

7 . day of /yC

£AY~,

2003
/

*.

Deputy Court Clerk
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BYRON CHILD CHRISTIANSEN
MERRILEE CHRISTIANSEN

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 030908140
Judge Fratto

V.

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE

The matter is before the court to consider Plaintiffs' Rule 37 Motion for Order
Compelling Discovery; Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and Request to Stay Breach
of Contract, Bad Faith and Associated Causes; defendant's Motion for Protective Order Pursuant
to Rule 26(c).
Plaintiffs' filed a complaint alleging three causes of action: breach of contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty. By stipulation, the
claim for breach of fiduciary duty was dismissed on July 15, 2003.
There is a written policy agreement providing for arbitration. The scope of arbitration
is contractually limited to disputes relative to recovery for damages caused by an uninsured or
under-insured motorist.
The applicable statutory provision is 78-3la-108(7), which provides that:
(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding
that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable,
the court may limit the stay to that claim.
Plaintiffs' complaint incorporates in each cause of action similar allegations of fact and
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theories of recovery. However, a distinction can be made between the causes. First Cause, Breach
of Contract seeks damages resultingfromthe negligence of the uninsured motorist to which
plaintiffs' claim they are contractually entitledfromdefendant. The breach is the failure of
defendant to pay these damages.
Second Cause, Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing prays relief
for defendant's failure to act upon, investigate and process plaintiffs' claims in a timely manner.
Thefirstclaim incorporates a dispute anticipated by the parties arbitration covenant. The second,
though related in the pleadings, is a different claim of breach of contract, not subject to
arbitration.
Although the court is afforded discretion in the statute, severance of the claims in this
case is appropriate. Plaintiffs' second cause cannot be arbitrated, and the resultsfromthe
arbitration will not affect the judicial outcome of the second cause.
Accordingly, arbitration of plaintiffs' First Cause of Action, Breach of Contract is
ordered, and that claim is stayed during the pendency of the arbitration. Defendant's request to
stay the claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is denied. That
cause of action will proceed.
Plaintiffs' seek an order compelling defendant to admit or deny a portion of those
certain Request for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents. The court has a copy
of the Request for Admissions, but does not have a request for production, and, consequently,
can make no determination concerning them.
Defendant responded to the request for admissions, as permitted by Rule 36(a)(1) Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, by lodging objections to certain requests on various grounds. Rather
2
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than compelling a response, the court is called upon to rule on the objections, and will do so.
The objections to Request Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are overruled. Counsel for plaintiffs
shall provide to counsel for defendant a copy of the written statement referenced in Request No.
7, and defendant shall admit or deny within five (5) day of receipt of the same.
Defendant's objection, lack of foundation, to Request No. 10 is sustained.
Defendant shall have ten (10) daysfromreceipt of this minute entry to admit or deny the
requests to which an objection was overruled.
Defendant's motion seeking a protective order concerning plaintiffs request for
production of documents cannot be addressed herein. As indicated above, the court does not have
a copy of the request, and cannot determine whether defendant is entitled to the court's order
protecting itfromproducing the material.
Accordingly, the clerk will schedule a telephonic conference to discuss the motion, and
defendanfwill provide a copy of the request directly to the clerk not less that two (2) days before
the conference.
This minute entry constitutes the order regarding the matters addressed herein. No further
order is required.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 03 0908140 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD NAME
Mail

Mail

Dated this

SCOTT D. BROWN
ATTORNEY PLA
6925 UNION PARK CENTER
SUITE 210
MIDVALE, UT 84047
BARBARA L MAW
ATTORNEY DEF
185 SOUTH STATE STREET
SUITE 340
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

/__ day of

Deputy Court Clerk

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 1 (last)

Tab 2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
the general
lsurer must
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,e of the exiversal UnMut. Auto.
PP- 1996).

History. C. 1953, 31A-22-304, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1992, ch. 132, § 2;
1993, ch. 271, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ers of their vehicles. There is no expressed
public policy that would require finding Hability based upon mere ownership of a vehicle.
Lane v. Honeywell, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 370 (D.
Utah 1987) (decided under former Title 31).

ANALYSIS

surers from
permissive
atisfies the
31A-22-304.
>7 P.2d 922
Exch., 751
ierv. Farmih Ct. App.
"o. v. North983 (Utah

obtains an)verage, 61

31A-22-305

Liability of county.
Liability of self-insurers.
Step-down coverage.
Cited.
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own
vehicles operated by permissive users, under
former law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712
R2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Liability of self-insurers.
Public policy as expressed in Utah law is that
self-insurers must provide security for damages
inflicted by themselves, and by permissive us-

Step-down coverage.
Section 31A-22-303 does not prohibit insurers from providing step-down coverage for permissive users, as long as the coverage satisfies
the statutory minimums set forth in this section. Cullum v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d
922 (Utah 1993).
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

e" for purR.4th 1053.
ationofproy excluding
employee of

A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, parent
or child of accident victim as within extended
"per accident" rather than "per person" coverage of automobile liability policy, 46 A.L.R.4th
735.
What constitutes single accident or occur-

ile "to carry
exclusion of
,.R.5th 591.

31A-22-305. Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.

un limlimit the
ith of one
accident;
a), in the
r death of
:le in any
ury to, or
f a motor
yury to or
roperty of

rence within Hability policy limiting insurer's
liability to a specified amount per accident or
occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668.
Validity and operation of "step-down" provision of automobile liability policy reducing coverage for permissive users, 29 A.L.R.5th 469.

(1) As used in this section, "covered persons" includes:
(a) the named insured;
(b) persons related to the named insured by blood, marriage, adoption,
or guardianship, who are residents of the named insured's household,
including those who usually make their home in the same household but
temporarily live elsewhere;
(c) any person occupying or using a motor vehicle:
(i) referred to in the policy; or
(ii) owned by a self-insurer; and
(d) any person who is entitled to recover damages against the owner or
operator of the uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily
injury to or death of persons under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) As used in this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" includes:
(a) (i) a motor vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is
not covered under a hability policy at the time of an injury-causing
occurrence; or
(ii) (A) a motor vehicle covered with lower liability limits than
required by Section 31A-22-304; and
(B) the motor vehicle described in Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) is
uninsured to the extent of the deficiency;
393
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(b) an unidentified motor vehicle that left the scene of an accident
proximately caused by the motor vehicle operator;
(c) a motor vehicle covered by a liability policy, but coverage for an
accident is disputed by the liability insurer for more than 60 days or
continues to be disputed for more than 60 days; or
(d) (i) an insured motor vehicle if, before or after the accident, the
liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of
competent jurisdiction; and
(ii) the motor vehicle described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is uninsured
only to the extent that the claim against the insolvent insurer is not
paid by a guaranty association or fund.
(3) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(b)
provides coverage for covered persons who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
uninsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the
insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured
motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's
motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser
amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:'
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase uninsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of
the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum uninsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Self-insurers, including governmental entities, may elect to provide
uninsured motorist coverage in an amount that is less than their maximum self-insured retention under Subsections (3)(b) and (4)(a) by issuing
a declaratory memorandum or policy statement from the chief financial
officer or chief risk officer that declares the:
(i) self-insured entity's coverage level; and
(ii) process for filing an uninsured motorist claim.
(d) Uninsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are
less than the minimum bodily injury limits for motor vehicle liability
policies under Section 31A-22-304.
(e) The acknowledgment under Subsection (3)(b) continues for that
issuer of the uninsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing,
requests different uninsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(f) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, an
explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage and the
costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and
including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry uninsured
motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's motor
394
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vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum uninsured motorist
coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's motor
vehicle policy.
(a) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), the named insured may
reject uninsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the
insurer that provides liability coverage under Subsection 31A-22302(l)(a).
(ii) This rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer that
includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage.
(hi) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage
until the insured in writing requests uninsured motorist coverage
from that liability insurer.
(b) (i) All persons, including governmental entities, that are engaged in
the business of, or that accept payment for, transporting natural
persons by motor vehicle, and all school districts that provide transportation services for their students, shall provide coverage for all
motor vehicles used for that purpose, by purchase of a policy of
insurance or by self-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least
$25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
(ii) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an
injured covered person.
(c) Uninsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
(hi) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers'
Compensation insurance;
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the
r. .covered person has been made whole;
(v) may not be collected for bodily injury or death sustained by a
person:
(A) while committing a violation of Section 41-la-1314;
(B) who, as a passenger in a vehicle, has knowledge that the
vehicle is being operated in violation of Section 41-la-1314; or
(C) while committing a felony; and
(vi) notwithstanding Subsection (4)(c)(v), may be recovered:
(A) for a person under 18 years of age who is injured within the
scope of Subsection (4)(c)(v) but limited to medical and funeral
expenses; or
(B) by a law enforcement officer as defined in Section 53-13103, who is injured within the course and scope of the law
enforcement officer's duties.
(d) As used in this Subsection (4):
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning as under Section
63-30-2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under Section 41-la102.
When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor vehicle under
Jction (2)(b) proximately caused an accident without touching the covered
395
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person or the motor vehicle occupied by the covered person, the covered person
must show the existence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and convincing evidence consisting of more than the covered person's testimony.
(6) (a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage for two or more
motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or stacked to
determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured person
for any one accident.
(b) (i) Subsection (6)(a) applies to all persons except a covered person
as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection (7)(b)(ii) is
entitled to the highest limits of uninsured motorist coverage afforded
for any one motor vehicle that the covered person is the named
insured or an insured family member.
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the motor
vehicle the covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off
against the other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of an accident shall
be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by a person described under
Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary coverage.
(7) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section apphes to bodily.^
injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered persons while occupying or
using a motor vehicle only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired or
replacement motor vehicle covered under the terms of the policy. Except as
provided in Subsection (6) or this Subsection (7), a covered person injured
in a motor vehicle described in a policy that includes uninsured motorist
benefits may not elect to collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from
any other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a covered
person.
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover uninsured motorist
benefits under any one other policy in which they are described as a
"covered person" as defined in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor
vehicle; and
(ii) except as provided in Subsection (7)(c), a covered person injured
while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not owned, leased, or
furnished, to the covered person, to the covered person's spouse, or to
the covered person's resident parent or resident sibling.
(c) (i) A covered person may recover benefits from no more than two
additional policies, one additional policy from each parent's household
if the covered person is:
(A) a dependent minor of parents who reside in separate
households; and
(B) injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that is not
owned, leased, or furnished to the covered person, the covered
person's resident parent, or to the covered person's resident
sibling.
(ii) Each parent's policy under this Subsection (7)(c) is liable only
for the percentage of the damages that the limit of liability of each
parent's policy of uninsured motorist coverage bears to the total of all
uninsured coverage applicable to the accident.
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(d) A covered person's recovery under any available policies may not
exceed the full amount of damages.
(e) A covered person in Subsection (7)(b) is not barred against making
subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a
motor vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or use of which is covered
under a liability policy at the time of an injury-causing occurrence, but
which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured
party for all special and general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the
same policy that also contains the underinsured motorist coverage;
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2); or
(hi) a motor vehicle owned or leased by the named insured, the
named insured's spouse, or any dependant of the named insured.
(9) (a) (i) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection 31A-22302(l)(c) provides coverage for covered persons who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owuers or operators of underinsured
motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death.
(ii) A covered person occupying or using a motor vehicle owned,
leased, or furnished to the covered person, the covered person's
spouse, or covered person's resident relative may recover underinsured benefits only if the motor vehicle is:
(A) described in the policy under which a claim is made; or
(B) a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle covered
under the terms of the policy.
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of
underinsured motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of
the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured's
motor vehicle policy, unless the insured purchases coverage in a lesser
amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided by the insurer that:
(i) waives the higher coverage;
(ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and
(iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits
of the insured's motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under
the insured's motor vehicle policy.
(c) Self-insurers, including governmental entities, may elect to provide
underinsured motorist coverage in an amount that is less than their
maximum self-insured retention under Subsections (9)(b) and (9)(g) by
issuing a declaratory memorandum or policy statement from the chief
financial officer or chief risk officer that declares the:
(i) self-insured entity's coverage level; and
(ii) process for filing an underinsured motorist claim.
(d) Underinsured motorist coverage may not be sold with limits that are
less than $10,000 for one person in any one accident and at least $20,000
for two or more persons in any one accident.
397

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

31A-22-305

INSURANCE CODE

(e) The acknowledgment under Subsection (9)(b) continues for that
issuer of the underinsured motorist coverage until the insured, in writing,
requests different underinsured motorist coverage from the insurer.
(f) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described
in Subsection (9)(a), is secondary to the liability coverage of an owner or
operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection (8).
Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off against the liability
coverage of the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle, but
shall be added to, combined with, or stacked upon the Uability coverage of
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle to determine the
limit of coverage available to the injured person.
(g) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage by
an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage
under Subsection 31A-22-302(l)(a).
(ii) This written rejection shall be on a form provided by the insurer
that includes a reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage and when it would be applicable.
(hi) This rejection continues for that issuer of the liability coverage
until the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage
from that liability insurer.
(h) (i) In conjunction with the first two renewal notices sent after^
January 1, 2001, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall
disclose in the same medium as the premium renewal notice, an
explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and the
costs associated with increasing the coverage in amounts up to and
including the maximum amount available by the insurer under the
insured's motor vehicle policy.
(ii) The disclosure shall be sent to all insureds that carry underinsured motorist coverage limits in an amount less than the insured's
motor vehicle liability policy limits or the maximum underinsured
motorist coverage limits available bjr the insurer under the insured's
motor vehicle policy.
(10) (a) (i) Except as provided in this Subsection (10), a covered person
injured in a motor vehicle described in a policy that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not elect to collect underinsured
motorist coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle insurance
policy.
(ii) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist coverage for two
or more motor vehicles may not be added together, combined, or
stacked to determine the limit of insurance coverage available to an
injured person for any one accident.
(iii) Subsection (10)(a)(ii) applies to all persons except a covered
person as defined under Subsections (10)(b)(i) and (ii).
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (10)(b)(ii), a covered person
injured while occupying, using, or maintaining a motor vehicle that is
not owned, leased, or furnished to the covered person, the covered
person's spouse, or the covered person's resident parent or resident
sibling, may also recover benefits under any one other policy under
which they are a covered person.
(ii) (A) A covered person may recover benefits from no more than
two additional policies, one additional policy from each parent's
household if the covered person is:
398
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(I) a dependent minor of parents who reside in separate
households; and
(II) injured while occupying or using a motor vehicle that
is not owned, leased, or furnished to the covered person, the
covered person's resident parent, or the covered person's
resident sibling.
(B) Each parent's policy under this Subsection (10)(b)(ii) is
liable only for the percentage of the damages that the limit of
liability of each parent's policy of underinsured motorist coverage
bears to the total of all underinsured coverage applicable to the
accident.
(iii) A covered person's recovery under any available policies may
not exceed the full amount of damages.
(iv) Underinsured coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time
of an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage elected by
a person described under Subsections (l)(a) and (b) shall be secondary
coverage.
(v) The primary and the secondary coverage may not be set off
against the other.
(vi) A covered person as defined under Subsection (10)(b)(i) is
entitled to the highest limits of underinsured motorist coverage under
only one additional policy per household applicable to that covered
person as a named insured, spouse, or relative.
(vii) A covered injured person is not barred against making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
(c) Underinsured motorist coverage:
(i) is secondary to the benefits provided by Title 34A, Chapter 2,
Workers' Compensation Act;
(ii) may not be subrogated by the Workers' Compensation insurance carrier;
(iii) may not be reduced by any benefits provided by Workers'
•V * Compensation insurance;
(iv) may be reduced by health insurance subrogation only after the
covered person has been made whole;
(v) may not be collected for bodily injury or death sustained by a
person:
(A) while committing a violation of Section 41-la-1314;
(B) who, as a passenger in a vehicle, has knowledge that the
vehicle is being operated in violation of Section 41-la-1314; or
(C) while committing a felony; and
(vi) notwithstanding Subsection (10)(c)(v), may be recovered:
(A) for a person under 18 years of age who is injured within the
scope of Subsection (10)(c)(v) but limited to medical and funeral
expenses; or
(B) by a law enforcement officer as defined in Section 53-13103, who is injured within the course and scope of the law
enforcement officer's duties.
(11) The inception of the loss under Subsection 31A-21-313M) for underinired motorist claims occurs upon the date of the last liability policy payment.
(12) (a) Within five business days after notification in a manner specified by
the department that all liability insurers have tendered their liability
policy limits, the underinsured carrier shall either:
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(i) waive any subrogation claim the underinsured carrier may have
against the person liable for the injuries caused in the accident; or
(ii) pay the insured an amount equal to the policy limits tendered
by the liability carrier,
(b) If neither option is exercised under Subsection (12)(a), the subrogation claim is deemed to be waived by the underinsured carrier.
(13) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a covered person may
seek, subject to the terms and conditions of the policy, additional coverage
under any policy:
(a) that provides coverage for damages resulting from motor vehicle
accidents; and
(b) that is not required to conform to Section 31A-22-302.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 157;
1987, ch. 162, § 1; 1992, ch. 1, § 4; 1992, ch.
132, § 3; 1993, ch. 271, § 2; 1994, ch. 316,
§ 15; 1995, ch. 294, § 1; 1996, ch. 240, § 12;
1997, ch. 375, § 14; 1999, ch. 158, § 1; 2000,
ch. 188, § 1; 2001, ch. 59, § 1; 2003, ch. 76,
§ 2; 2003, ch. 218, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, added Subsection (2)(c), redesignating former Subsection
(2)(c) as (2)(d), and made related and stylistic
changes in the section.
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000,
added Subsections (3)(b) to (3)(e), (4)(a)(ii),
(4)(c)(ii) to (4)(c)(iv), (9)(b) to (9)(d), (9)(f)(ii),
(10)(c), and (11), and made related changes;
deleted "For new policies or contracts written
after January 1, 1993" from the beginning of
Subsection (9)(f)(i); rewrote Subsection (9)(g),
revising the provisions for notice and disclosure; and made stylistic changes.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30,

2001, corrected a subsection reference in Subsection (10)(b)(ii) and added Subsection (12).
The 2003 amendment by ch. 76, effective May
5, 2003, substituted "motor vehicle" for "vehicle" several times throughout the section; deleted "beginning with the effective date of this
act" before "continues" in Subsection (2)(c);
added Subsections (4)(c)(v), (7)(c) and (d),
(8)(b)(iii), (9)(a)(ii), and (13); rewrote Subsections (7)(b), (10), and (11); and made related
and stylistic changes.
The 2003 amendment by ch. 218, effective
May 5, 2003, inserted subdivision designations
(i and (ii) in Subsection (l)(c); deleted "beginning with the effective date of this act" before
"continues" in Subsection (2)(c); added "and" at
the end of Subsection (2)(d)(i); added Subsections (3)(c) and (9)(c); made appropriate
changes in subsection designations; and made a
spelling correction and stylistic changes.
This section has been reconciled by the Office
of Legislative Research and General Counsel.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Construction with other statutes.
Exclusionary clause.
Hit and run.
"Legally entitled to recover."
Cited.
Construction with other statutes.
The Workers' Compensation Act is not the
exclusive remedy for injured employees who
seek to recover from someone who is not their
employer, or an officer, agent, or employee of
the employer, and these employees do have
viable claims against such third parties. Lieber
v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr, Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15
R3d 1030.
The Workers' Compensation Act does not
preclude injured employees from having alternative viable claims against an uninsured
third-party tortfeasor, or against an uninsured

motorist insurance carrier; therefore, the trial
court erred when it interpreted Subsection
(4)(h)(ii) of this section to preclude recovery of
both workers' compensation and uninsured motorist benefits in every case. Lieber v. ITT
Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90, 15 P.3d
1030.
Exclusionary clause.
An exclusionary clause to uninsured motorist
coverage is permissible. Former § 41-12-21.1,
which required insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage and authorized motorists to
waive coverage, did not further require insurers to allow an individual to purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain coverage on all
the other vehicles in his household. Clark v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227
(Utah 1987).
Neither this section nor public policy forbids
restrictions on uninsured motorist coverage
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES
such as an exclusion from coverage of vehicles
owned by the insured not included in the policy
and for which no premiums are paid. Hind v.
Quilles, 745 R2d 1239 (Utah 1987).
A policy that covered the insured for any
injury caused by an uninsured motorist, excluding therefrom only uninsured "automobiles *' owned by the insured, did not exclude
uninsured motorist coverage when the insured
was operating a motorcycle. Bear River Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Wright, 770 P.2d 1019 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Hit and run.
Utah law does not require an actual collision
to recover under the uninsured motorist statute. Marakis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 765

31A-22-305

P.2d 882 (Utah 1988) (decided under prior law).
"Legally entitled to recover.*
For an insured to satisfy the "legally entitled
to recover" criterion, a viable claim that can be
reduced to judgment is required. Peterson v.
Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 927 P.2d 192 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 934 R2d 652 (Utah
1997).
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); United States
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519 (Utah
1993); Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002
UT App 221, 51 P.3d 1288, cert, denied, 59 P.3d
603.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Automobile
Insurance § 35 et seq.
A.L.R. — Time limitations as to claims based
on uninsured motorist clause, 28 A.L.R.3d 580.
Vahdity of exclusion in automobile insurance
policy precluding recovery of no-fault benefits
for injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured vehicle owned
by an insured, 18 A.L.R.4th 632.
Validity, construction, and effect of "consent
to sue" clauses in uninsured motorist endorsement of automobile insurance policy, 24
AL.R.4th 1024.
Combining or "stacking" uninsured motorist
coverages provided in policies issued by different insurers to different insureds, 28 A.L.R.4th
362.
Validity of exclusion of injuries sustained by
insured while occupying "owned" vehicle not
insured by policy, 30 A.L.R.4th 172.
Vahdity, construction, and effect of statute
establishing compensation for claims not paid
because of insurer's insolvency, 30 A.L.R.4th
1110.
Uninsured motorist insurance: injuries to
motorcyclist as within affirmative or exclusionary terms of automobile insurance policy, 46
A.L.R.4th 771.
Punitive damages as within coverage of uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance, 54
A.L.R.4th 1186.
Right of insured, precluded from recovering
against owner or operator of uninsured motor
vehicle because of governmental immunity, to
recover uninsured motorist benefits, 55
A.L.R.4th 806.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute mandating insurance coverage,
59A.L.R.4thl49.

Automobile uninsured motorist coverage: "legally entitled to recover" clause as barring
claim compensable under workers' compensation statute, 82 A.L.R.4th 1096.
"Excess" or "umbrella" insurance policy as
providing coverage for accidents with uninsured or underinsured motorists, 2 A.L.R.5th
922.
Insured's recovery of uninsured motorist's
claim against insurer as affecting subsequent
recovery against tortfeasors causing injury, 3
A.L.R.5th 746.
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: enforceability of policy provision limiting
appeals from arbitration, 23 A.L.R.5th 801.
Uninsured or underinsured motorist insurance: validity and construction of policy provision purporting to reduce recovery by amount
of social security disability benefits or payments under similar disability benefits law, 24
A.L.R.5th 766.
Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage: vahdity, construction, and effect of policy
provision purporting to reduce coverage by
amount paid or payable under workers' compensation law, 31 A.L.R.5th 116.
Right of employer or workers' compensation
carrier to lien against, or reimbursement out of,
uninsured or underinsured motorist proceeds
payable to employee injured by third party, 33
A.L.R.5th 587.
Validity and construction of provision of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage that
damages under the coverage will be reduced by
amount of recovery from tortfeasor, 40
A.L.R.5th 603.
Requirement that multicoverage umbrella
insurance policy offer uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage equal to liability limits
under umbrella provisions, 52 A.L.R.5th 451.
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Validity of territorial restrictions on uninsured/underinsured coverage in automobile insurance policies, 55 A.L.R.5th 747.
Validity, construction, and application of exelusion of government vehicles from uninsured
motorist provision, 58 A.L.R.5th 511.
Automobile insurance: what constitutes "occupying" under owned-vehicle exclusion on uninsured- or underinsured-motorist coverage of
automobile insurance policy, 59 A.L.R.5th 191.
Who is "member" or "resident" of same "family" or "household" within no-fault or uninsured
motorist provisions of motor vehicle insurance
policy, 66 A.L.R.5th 269.

Uninsured motorist indorsement: construction and application of requirement that there
be "physical contact" with unidentified or hitand-run vehicle; "Huss-and-run'' cases, 77
A.L.R.5th 319.
Uninsured motorist indorsement: general issues regarding requirement that there be
"physical contact" with unidentified or hit-andrun vehicle, 78 A.L.R.5th 341.
Uninsured motorist indorsement: construction and application of requirement that there
be "physical contact" with unidentified or hitand-run vehicle; "hit-and-run" cases, 79
A.L.R.5th 289.

31A-22-305.5. Property damage protection.
(1) At the request of the named insured, every motor vehicle liability policy
of insurance under Sections 31A-22-303 and 31A-22-304 or combination of
policies purchased to satisfy the owner's or operator's security requirement of
Section 41-12a-301 which policy does not provide insurance for collision
damage shall provide coverage for property damage to the motor vehicle
described in the policy for the benefit of covered persons, as defined under
Section 31A-22-305, who are legally entitled to recover damages from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, as defined under Subsections
31A-22-305(2)(a), (c), and (d), arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use
of an uninsured motor vehicle.
(2) The coverage provided under this section shall include payment for loss
or damage to the motor vehicle described in the policy, not to exceed the motor
vehicle's actual cash value or $3,500, whichever is less. Property damage does
not include compensation for loss of use of the motor vehicle.
(3) The coverage provided under this section shall be payable only if:
(a) the occurrence causing the property damage involves actual physical contact between the covered motor vehicle and an uninsured motor
vehicle;
(b) the owner, operator, or license plate number of the uninsured motor
vehicle is identified; and
(c) the insured or someone on his behalf reports the occurrence within
ten days to the insurer or his agent.
(4) The coverage provided under this section shall be subject to a $250
deductible and shall be excess to any other insurance covering property
damage to the motor vehicle described in the policy.
(5) The insurer providing coverage under this section may make available
additional deductibles at appropriate premium rates.
(6) No rating surcharge may be applied to any policy of motor vehicle
insurance issued in this state as a result of payment of a claim made under this
section.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-305.5, enacted
by L. 1990, ch. 321, § 1; 1999, ch. 158, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective March 18, 1999, substituted

"Subsections 31A-22-305(2)(a), (c), and (d)" for
"Subsections 31A-22-305(2)(a) and (c)" in Subsection (1).
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